ABSTRACT As an innovative networking paradigm in the Internet of Things, information-centric networking (ICN) has improved security than the traditional IP networks. However, it still faces a large number of security threats, especially those threats from internal attacks. The trust management technology is an effective approach for defending against internal attacks. In this paper, our contributions lie in our investigating the requirements of cybersecurity in ICN and analyzing the typical attack behaviors and defense schemes. Then, we propose a fast and efficient trust management scheme (FETMS) for defending against the on-off attack, which is an intelligent internal attack. The simulation results show that FETMS can efficiently detect and remove the malicious node in a short period of time; meanwhile, it can achieve lower latency and add its mobility. Information-centric networking (ICN) , Internet of Things, cyber security, trust management, on-off attacks.
the network operation is complex. Naming, addressing and routing mechanism in ICN is based on information, one name can bind multiple network addresses to support the multihost-multi-path transmission in the network layer. We look forward that the protocol overhead and network operation complexity could be reduced.
In China, a flexible three clouds 5G mobile network architecture is proposed by the China Telecom (as shown in figure 1 ). In this architecture, the accessing cloud, the controlling cloud and the forwarding cloud in 5G-ICN are constructed by the enabling technology based on SDN (Software Defined Networking) /NFV (Network Functions Virtualization). NFV provides the software and hardware decoupling, the resilient and scalable infrastructure and softwareized network function, realizes the flexible deployment of network resource and function, maximizes the utilization of resources. In SDN, the depth programmable technology separates the logic function in a softwareized forwarding plane and controlling plane more clearly. The centralized control function, unified naming and resolution is conducive to the network in providing on-demand sessions, mobility, cache control management from a global view on the cognition of network status.
Furthermore, an efficient and customizable storage forwarding function is provided. The forwarding plane is simplified. The storage services and computation services are moved to the edge of network by distributed deployment, then further into the access network, so that the high speed and low latency service requirements are directly supported and met for the 5G-ICN network with the centralized controlling plane under the unified control.
The control function is centralized in 5G-ICN. In forwarding plane, the data processing is controlled by POF (Protocol Oblivious Forwarding) controller. The network control function, the scheduling management function based on NFV are connected with the northbound interface POF controller. The customizable network resources and service on-demand network functions are provided, and network capacity openness is implemented by the depth programming and service scheduling.
Many traditional cyber security mechanisms are established with the hosts. It is closely related to the trustworthiness of the host. Once the host is not trusted, the information on the host is not trusted. The cyber security mechanism in ICN is built on information. Actually, the information security is related to the information itself, and there is no necessary connection with the containers of stored information. In ICN, the graininess of the security policy based on information become more refined, and the security mechanism is more reasonable and trusted.
Different from typical distributed networks, ICN's topology is very flexible. The internal attacks faced by ICN are far more harmful than external attacks. The traditional cyber security mechanisms, such as encryption, authentication, and authentication, are well defended against external attacks, but they cannot effectively against internal attacks. This is due to that, the terminal/node in ICN is compromised, and the key and secure algorithm have been obtained by an internal attacker. Researches have shown that the trust management is an effective approach to defend against internal attacks. The contribution of this paper is that, we investigate the requirements of cyber security in ICN systemically, analyze the typical attack behaviors and defense schemes for ICN. Especially, we point out the internal attacks are difficult to defend, we propose a Fast and Efficient Trust Management Scheme (FETMS) for defending against the On-Off attack, namely, an intelligent internal attack.
The reason that IP architecture is proposed to be replaced is that it cannot meet the massive information services in Internet, besides, there are serious security issues in the IP architecture. ICN takes into account the security issues in the beginning. Compared to IP architecture, it makes the entire network architecture more resistant to defend against the security attack, even so, there are some security attacks for ICN. From the point of view of the security attack, the ICN's security threats come from the internal attacks. There are more researches to show that the trust management scheme can defend against the internal attack effectively. In this paper, the FETMS for ICN is proposed to meet above requirements, which involve defending against a typical internal attack -On-Off attack and achieving fast response.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the state-of-the-art on security attacks are highlighted for ICN. Some preliminary knowledge on trust management is represented in Section III. The FETMS is proposed, simulated and analyzed in Section IV. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section V.
II. SECURITY CHALLENGE FOR ICN
In this section, we give a holistic overview of the security attack for ICN, which are divided into four categories: naming attacks, routing attacks, cache attacks, and other malicious attacks. The attack behavior and defense scheme are represented for each security attack.
A. NAMING ATTACKS 1) ATTACK BEHAVIOR
Since there are no any host identifiers in ICN, an attacker can disguise as an ICN's node or router to monitor the data traffic. There are two attack behaviors related to the naming attack: watch list and sniffing.
Watch list: an attacker can construct a pre-defined list that he wants to filter or delete, and attack by monitoring the network link. If the predefined list matches any information in the network, the information can be deleted or the information of the requester can be logged by the attacker. The monitoring list attack can cause user privacy to be disclosed or may cause their service to be rejected.
Sniffing: an attacker can detect the marked data via the monitoring network, analyze the contents of the request. If the information is found, the attacker will delete or filter them. This attack behavior can lead to the Denial of Service (DoS), the user's request will not be responded, meanwhile, the their privacy will be threatened.
2) DEFENSE SCHEMES
Clarke et al. [8] proposed a user anonymous scheme to construct a Freenet system. The Freenet was a distributed information storage system, and it was designed to address information privacy and network survival issues. The Freenet was operated as an Ad-hoc P2P network, it brought together unused disk space in many desktop computers to create collaborative and virtual file systems. This proposed scheme could prevent the attacker from obtaining the user who requested the content, unfortunately, the attacker could still obtain the requested content.
Arianfar et al. [9] designed an asymmetric algorithm. This algorithm's goal was that the attacker would have to pay lots of costs to retrieve the content, yet the legal user could easily retrieve it. However, this scheme was proposed under a large number of assumptions, several of which are not used in ICN. It is suitable to exist in the network under the conditions of numerous users, and could not provide the effective privacy preservation.
Ion et al. [10] designed a content-centric privacy preservation scheme for ICN. The attribute-based encryption was introduced to prioritize the data attributes, in order to enhance the capability to protect data confidentiality in ICN. However, this scheme was only tested in the NDN (Named Data Networking) architecture, and has not been proved applicable to other ICN architecture.
B. ROUTING ATTACKS 1) ATTACK BEHAVIOR
In the routing process, an attacker can destroy the successful transmission by destroying the consistency between data state, so as to achieve the purpose of attack. These attack behaviors can be divided into two types: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and spoofing.
Distributed denial of service (DDoS): an attacker transmits lots of useless data to occupy the network resources so that the normal users cannot obtain the resources and be denied service, and cause the infrastructure exhaustion attack. He can also select a single node and send massive request to it, which leads to this node overload, and deny service, so as to achieve the source attack. Besides, he can yet make a mobile router overload, resulting in a regional network be blocked, and deny service, so as to achieve mobile blockade attack. He can also send requests that exceed the upper limit of the node, causing nodes in the network to ignore other requests behind them to achieve flooding attacks [11] . In addition, he can send a large number of requests to reduce the performance of lowprofile routers, so that the consistency for the asynchronous distribution and subscription process are damaged to achieve timing attacks.
Spoofing: since each node in the ICN can cache and publish content, an attacker can disguise as a legitimate user, sending a large amount of messy request information in the network so that the information traffic in the system is disturbed to achieve the purpose of the jamming attack [12] . He can also disguise as a trusted publisher so that the neighboring node trust the masquerading node to forward the request to these routes, namely hijacking attack. This attack behavior may cause the user's request to be transmitted to these masquerading nodes without receiving a response. Alternatively, he could act as a trusted routing node to record requests from other legitimate requests, furthermore, launch the interception attacks, so that the requester's privacy was completely compromised.
2) DEFENSE SCHEMES
The DDoS attack is a common IP network attack, it also exists in the ICN. Dai et al. [13] proposed the interest tracing as defending against DDoS attack in NDN. This scheme could effectively mitigate this attack in NDN. Compagno et al. [14] proposed Poseidon, a framework for detecting and mitigating the Interest Flooding Attack (IFA), and the Poseidon was designed by the cooperation between the routings. Salah et al. [15] argued that the IFA can be effectively detected and mitigated protected based on the real-time and aggregated information on the exchanged packets and forwarding state in the early stages. For purposes of this, they adjusted the CoMon. It was the framework of their previous development to coordinate NDN cache-related decisions. This CoMon was demonstrated that it could achieve efficient and lightweight coordination, however, the scheme has not yet been formally adapted to other ICN frameworks.
C. CACHE ATTACKS 1) ATTACK BEHAVIOR
In ICN, a node can potentially cache any content, obviously, an attacker could launch the attack based on the observation or other vulnerabilities during the caching process. In general, the cache attacks are divided into the time analysis attacks, the bogus announcement attack and the cache pollution attack.
Time analysis attack: an attacker could observe the other nodes, especially those nodes that respond to caching and uncaching requests, and make an analysis to determine if the node has requested the same content as the malicious node. If the above analysis is successful, it was demonstrated that the normal node and the malicious node had requested the same content. In other words, the data of this node had been ''guessed'' by the malicious node.
Bogus announcement attack: an attacker transmits the cache updates over the frequency of the local request route coverage time, thereby disrupting the cache system so that the contents of some overloaded nodes are not correct or incomplete. The purpose of the attack is achieved.
Cache pollution attack: a node can cache any potential information in ICN. An attacker can randomly transmit some small probability content requests to the network, which is called non-popular content [16] . This behavior causes the node to cache the content and flush out the usual content information. This attack can lead to the response time of the legitimate user to become longer.
2) DEFENSE SCHEMES
Acs et al. [17] analyzed the scope and feasibility of the caching attack, then proposed and evaluated some effective countermeasures. By marking the privacy contents of the user's consideration, they made the content a random latency, and then feedback the content of the request. This scheme could provide quantifiable privacy guarantees, and retain the key features of the NDN. However, they had not yet found an effective way to address the shortcomings of the resulting network latency.
Ghali et al. [18] also proposed that rank the cache content ranking scheme with an in-depth research of cache corruption attack to defend against the caching attack. This scheme was based on a verification signature, which was used to discard a message that was not passed. It maintained a ranking that made the contents of the user's new request former, and the contents of the discarded later. It was to achieve the purpose of mitigating the cache attack in ICN.
Xylomenos [19] established a reputation mechanism for ICN, In this reputation mechanism, the reputation value for each ICN's node was dynamically assigned and adjusted according to the user's behavior. The purpose of this scheme was to prevent hidden prier from spying on the privacy in the ICN;s cache.
D. OTHER MALICIOUS ATTACKS
From the above Four analyses of security threats, we can demonstrate that come from most of the external attacks. Currently, most technologies of defending against external attacks involve encryption, digital signature, authentication, etc., and also obtain valuable defense results.
However, these technologies are not suitable for defending against the internal attacks. this is due to that, the internal attacks are launched by compromised nodes. These nodes have keys, passwords, etc., therefore, traditional security technologies cannot effectively defend against them. We can imagine that a malicious attacker enters the ICN, and disguises as a common legal node, repeatedly replies or blocks the requested data, causing the requester to misinterpret the received response data. It is the packet mistreatment attack. in which the attacker can modify the package many times in the transmission, and reply to the transmitter. In addition, since an attacker could invade a route to obtain a copy of any forwarding data, so as to cause the unauthorized access attack. It has been documented that trust management techniques can effectively detect and defend against internal attacks [20] . Furthermore, On-Off attack is a typical internal attack in distributed network [21] . In general, if the malicious node performs n good behaviors and m bad behaviors alternating, this is referred as a nG-mB On-Off attack. This attack has a strong concealment, and the traditional cyber security scheme is difficult to defend against it.
For detecting and defending against the above attacks, Ion et al. [10] designed a content-centric privacy scheme for ICN. It could defend against the unauthorized access attacks. The attribute-based encryption was introduced in ICN, and it was specific to the data attributes to enhance the ICN's ability to support data confidentiality. The finegrained access control was achieved by using more expressive policy. In this attribute-based scheme, the encryption key was generated based on the data or the recipient's attributes, and only the authorized recipient could access the content. Fang et al. [22] proposed a Time-window-based Resilient Trust Management Scheme (TRTMS) for defending against the reputation time-varying (RTV) attack, which is very similar to an On-Off attack. Although TRTMS can detect and remove the malicious modes accurately, it is suitable for fast mobile ICN. In addition, they proposed a binomial distribution-based trust management scheme (BDTMS) for e-health [23] . This scheme could achieve effectively to defend against On-Off attacks in healthcare-oriented wireless sensor network. Liu et al. [24] carry out a trust joint light probe based defense (TLPD) mechanism proposed for industrial communication systems (ICSs). The proposed scheme is constructed by three major components, including light probe routing, trust estimation, and trust-aware routing. It can quickly and easily identify a malicious smart sensor node. Caminha et al. [25] introduce a smart middleware automatically to assess the IoT resources trust, evaluating service providers attributes to defend against On-off attacks.
Li et al. [26] proposed a lightweight integrity verification (LIVE) architecture, which was an extension of NDN. This architecture could solve two issues: 1) the existing heavyweight signature generation and verification algorithm that prevented generic integrity verification between NDN nodes, might lead to content corruption and denial of service attacks; 2) cache and location-independent content accesses had an ability, which prohibited the content providers from accessing content, such as who could cache content and which terminal users or devices could access content. Compared with the traditional public key signature scheme, LIVE's verification delay was reduced by more than 20 times.
From the above analysis, the ICN is facing enormous security threats. Most of them come from the internal attacks. Some recent researches suggest that the trust management technology is one of defending approach against the internal attacks. In the next sections, we will discuss and propose a fast and efficient trust management scheme to defend against the On-Off attack for information-centric networking.
III. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE OF TRUST MANAGEMENT A. TRUST AND REPUTATION 1) SOCIOLOGICAL CATEGORY
In the sociology, the trust is considered to be a kind of dependence. Trustworthy individual or group means they seek practical policies, code of ethics, laws and their previous commitments. Interdependence means that there is an exchange relationship between the two sides, regardless of the exchange of content, that both sides must rely on each other to achieve their own interests.
The reputation, refers to the attachment between people, enterprises and commodity trading to form a mutual and trustful production relations and social relations. The reputation constitutes a relationship between people, between units, commodity transactions between the two sides, and makes them consciously and repeated exchanges, consumers are even willing to pay more money to extend this relationship.
2) COMPUTER NETWORK
In the specific application of computer network, those vague and abstract issues need to be standardized and digitized. The clear instructions are essential to perform the task in system, hence, the trust need to be defined as a clear statement in order to make the network system work normally and steadily. Furthermore, For removing the compromised node from the network, the trust management system is proposed. The traditional trust management technology was first applied in e-commerce, used to select the reliable trade partner, and then it was deployed many applications. In addition, In a distributed computer network system, the trust is defined as, in a given time period and context, the entities make other entity a integer, secure and reliable subjective judgment by a certain time of observation and historical experience. In a word, the trust itself is one of the security mechanism, its function is to resist the internal attack, and achieve the network self-healing.
The reputation can be defined to make an expectation of the entity's future behaviors, in a given time period and context, according to the observation information of other entities and associated with the cooperation of historical experience.
3) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUST AND REPUTATION
The reputation is firstly based on the occurrence of events and the evaluation of the surrounding nodes, and it is the views or opinions for one particular node. The reputation is the prerequisite for the trust, and the trust is based on reputation, it is a specific value as the quantification of reputation, which represent the degree of trust to the entity. Secondly, the reputation is based on the occurrence of events and the evaluation of the surrounding nodes, so it will randomly change, Moreover, the trust is more determined by the entities historical behaviors. The change in reputation usually has a certain impact on the trust, the reputation is the foundation of the trust, so the trust and reputation are inseparable.
4) TRUST'S CHARACTERISTICS
The trust is dynamic in the trust management system. It will change with the changes in reputation (that is, a change in reputation resulting from the occurrence of various events over time). The trust is subjective, the evaluation standard of each entity for the same entity is different, the trust will be also different.
B. TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The trust management system is a broad concept, including all the content related to the trust. In distributed networks, the trust management system usually includes the trust elements collection and storage, the reputation modeling and transferring, the derivation of trust, the reputation and trust storage, application decisions, and so on. According to the research contents of the trust management system, the trust management system can be divided into the following five parts: collection, storage, modeling, transmission and decision.
1) COLLECTION
The interaction between the nodes (Interaction), sensor data and location information elements are collected in this phase. This is to facilitate the establishment of a later trust management system. which evaluates the node reputation based on the collected trust elements, and then obtain the trust value. With the trust elements collected more widely, the trust value is more accurate.
2) STORAGE
The storage phase includes the storage of the trust elements, the reputation values, and the trust values. Since the memory of node is constrained, the storage of information should be considered. First of all, the form of information will have an impact on storage space, for example, the floating-point type needs more space than integer, and there is more space needed for the signed number than the unsigned number. Secondly, the storage time of information should be considered, and the outdated information needs to be emptied in order to save storage space; Finally, the storage locations of information should be considered, such as in the cluster network, the trust value is stored in the cluster head. when the cluster members need to use this information, it be transmitted to the cluster members. This approach saves storage space of cluster members, however, increases the communication cost.
3) MODELING
In order to represent the reputation and trust, so they need to be modeled. It is the core of the trust management system. Modeling needs to consider many aspects, such as the aging of the trust value, whether the use of indirect information, the indirect information weight, the weight of various trust elements, as well as defending scheme against attacks. Meanwhile, the computational capacity, the node power supply, the different network topology and other practical factors must be considered synthetically. In general, the reputation model is a probabilistic statistical model, which involves the Beta distribution, Gauss distribution, binomial distributions, and so on.
4) TRANSFERRING
The transfer involves the reputation transfer and the trust transfer. The reputation transfer usually refers to the indirect messages when the node's reputation is evaluated. The trust transfer means that, when a node requests to obtain the trust value of the evaluated node, and it is transferred. Typically, in clustering networks or some node localization systems, the trust transfer is considered because member nodes do not have the ability to store trust values. In addition, when the reputation and trust are transferred, the mode of transmission and security issues should also be concerned.
5) DECISION
When the node has finished the trust evaluation, and obtained the trust value, the trust according decision should be made based on the trust value. The decision involves two aspects: at first, the nodes should be selected the cooperative node with the trust value. The common approach is to set a threshold, when the trust value of a node exceeds the threshold, it can be taken as a trusted node, and then the trusted node can participate in the cooperation between nodes; Second, it is to determine how to punish the nodes of the low trust value. There are commonly used approaches, those nodes of the low trust value are directly added to the blacklist and eliminated the network, or make them regain trust based on energy consumption or the consideration of the selfish nodes.
C. TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEME
The trust management scheme is very similar to the trust management system. The significant difference between them is that the former has no storage phase. Moreover, the former focus on defending against the security attacks. Usually, the attacks models are established in the trust management scheme. All attack behaviors are described as the change of the trust value. For examples, the slander attack (Badmouthing attack) is defined as many malicious compromised nodes transfers the negative evaluation of normal node to reduce its trust value. What's more, lots of malicious compromised nodes can also work like normal nodes and cumulate high enough trust value to provide reputation evaluation error for other compromised nodes, which is called as collusion attack. Different trust management schemes can defend against different security attacks. Unfortunately, there is no trust management scheme that defends against all internal attacks known to date. On the one hand, because the sensor node resources are limited, such as calculation, storage, energy, etc., the research on trust management of wireless sensor network is mostly based on trust management scheme. The establishment of the trust management scheme is shown in figure 2 .
In the next section, a fast and efficient trust management scheme for ICN will be discussed and proposed, to defend against the On-Off attack.
IV. FAST AND EFFICIENT TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEME
Different from the hijacking attack and the badmouthing attack, the On-Off attack have dual behaviors: good behavior and bad behavior. This attack has strong concealed and great harm, unfortunately, the traditional trust management schemes are very difficult to detect and defend against it. Although several recent trust management schemes can achieve above secure function, they are not suitable for mobile scenarios in ICN. In this section, we propose a fast and efficient trust management scheme. Then, we simulate and analyze it by using MATLAB.
A. FAST AND EFFICIENT TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEME
In this sub-section, the Fast and Efficient Trust Management Scheme (FETMS) based on the beta distribution of reputation is proposed, and the process of establishing FETMS is given in detail.
1) INTERACTION AND EVALUATION
When the node i needs to interact with the node j, it evaluates the trust value of node j, and then decides whether to further interaction or not. Specifically, based on the existing interaction information, it calculates the reputation distribution of node j. Then, based on the reputation distribution, the direct trust value is obtained. Eventually, it transmits a broadcast signal to the neighbor nodes for requesting the trust value of node j, which will be utilized for the final trust value calculation as the indirect trust value. The interaction and evaluation process is shown in Figure 3 .
2) DISTRIBUTION OF REPUTATION
When the trust and reputation values are calculated, both the communication trust and the data trust are incorporated. Based on the beta distribution, the reputation of node i to node j is R ij = Beta(a+1, b+1) , where, assume that there are (a + b) times interactions between the nodes. About the communication trust, a is the number of cooperation interactions, and b is the number of noncooperation interactions. About the data trust, a is the number of normal data interaction, and b is the number of error data interaction.
Furthermore, the direct trust evaluation refers to the statistical expectation of reputation function.
3) REPUTATION UPDATING AND AGING
The reputation needs to be updated over time. Here, we suppose that, the metric R ij that represents the reputation of node i and node j is established. The interaction between node i and node j remains (r + s) times, where r is the number of the normal cooperation and s is the number of data transmission error. The normalization operation is performed to obtain the reputation R ij of node j.
Moreover, the recent information for reputation and trust has more weight, so the aging weight value (w aging ) is added. Its value range is (0, 1). The aging weight represents that all the nodes cooperate together. A compromised node can select the cooperative policy at the start, and then utilize the initial reputation to destroy the network. The suitable aging weight value can represent the reputation being old. The nodes need to cooperate together for keeping a good reputation.
4) INDIRECT TRUST
To node i, the indirect trust of node j comes from the evaluation of neighbor node k. The indirect observation of node k to node j can be expressed as a k j , b k j . The node i already has obtained the reputation information of node j and other neighbor nodes (i.e. node c), which can be 
5) REPUTATION TRANSFERRING AND TRUST VALUE
Since the indirect information is utilized to calculate the trust value, this information needs to be transmitted between nodes. For avoiding the self-loop of the information traffic, only direct trust can be transferred between nodes. In a word, the direct trust value for one node is the indirect trust value for another node. These values will be combined with its direct value for obtaining the final trust value. It is expressed following:
6) ATTACK BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND DEFENDING POLICY
The On-Off attack is an internal attack, and has strong harmfulness. It performs some good behaviors (i.e. forwarding the data packets, providing the normal routing) or bad behaviors (i.e. discarding or tampering the data packets) actively. These behaviors appear non-stationary periodic characteristics. In general, from the trust management, the compromised node that launches the On-Off attack can obtain more higher trust value by continuously performing the good behaviors in a short period of time. Thereafter, it performs the bad behaviors during a long time intermittently, and its trust value reduces slowly. When the trust value of the compromised node drops to a certain extent, it performs the good behavior again. Hence, the trust value of this malicious node ascends quickly, yet descends slowly. The changes in trust value of normal node and compromised node are shown in figure 4 . From this figure, we can conclude that the trust value is ascending for the normal, finally, this trust value tends to 1, and basically remains stable. On the contrary, the trust value of the malicious node that launching On-Off attack shows the changes of non-stationary cycle.
To defend against the On-Off attack, we propose a fast and efficient trust management scheme for ICN. Firstly, a time interval between the highest trust value (T h (i)) and the next highest trust value (T h (i + 1)) is defined as a detection period (P(i)). The lowest trust value in a detection period is defined as (T l (i)). Secondly, a descent time is presented as (t d (i)), which is a time interval from T h (i) to T l (i), as well as an ascent time (t a (i)) from T l (i) to T h (i + 1). Finally, any trust (i, m) ) during a descent time is given, and any trust value (T a (i, n)) during a descent time is given. If the following relationship is satisfied, the malicious node that launched the On-Off attack can be basically detected.
where, F d is the detection flag. If F d is 0, the detected node is malicious. Otherwise, it is a normal node. Once those prerequisites are satisfied, the malicious node that launch the On-Off attack could be easily detected. Waiting for these malicious nodes will be removed from the forwarding list, or will never be trusted by the ICN.
B. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
Here, we assume that the node's reputation is related to the behavior of the node itself. In addition, the environmental influence, the wireless channel, and the energy consumption are ignored. These simulation parameters (they mainly come from the literature [21] ) are shown in table I. The result is simulated in Figure 4 and 5 by MATLAB. For TRTMS, it is suitable for those scenarios of slow moving obstacle in wireless sensor network. It accurately achieves to detect and remove (that is, the trust value of the malicious node is set 0, and it is removed from the trust list) the VOLUME 7, 2019 malicious nodes by using the length of time window and the reversal number, and effectively defend against the On-Off attack. Unfortunately, the TRTMS is Not fully applicable to ICN. From the figure 5, under On-Off attack, the FETMS has detected and removed the malicious node in a detection period, yet the TRTMS need three detection periods to do same. Under certain circumstances, the FETMS also need 1.5 detection periods to defend against the On-Off attack.
Efficiency means that it is more effective in distinguishing between attacks and accidental obstacles than TRTMS. Further, for an individual internal (i.e., On-Off) attack or external obstacle, the On-Off attacks is to obtain a high trust value as soon as possible, The change of trust value follows the characteristics of convex functions, and the departure process of the obstacle is a concave function feature.
In addition, compared to BDTMS, we can demonstrate that BDTMS is suitable for scenarios with many obstacles and low speeds (e.g., community nursing center, nursing home and ward). In theory, BDTMS is not applicable for ICN, in particular, those high speed scenarios.
V. CONCLUSIONS
ICN is an innovative networking paradigm in the Internet of Things. Different from the traditional IP security mechanisms built on the host, the cyber security mechanism in ICN is established on the information. ICN has more security than traditional IP networks. However, this does not mean that ICN suffers no threats. Based on the existing researches, it is facing more internal attack threats. The contributions of this paper are the following two aspects. One is that the security attacks and defenses for ICN are reviewed and analyzed systematically, especially On-Off attack, which is a typical internal attack. The other is we introduce that the trust management technology for defending against the internal attacks, i.e., a fast and efficient trust management scheme (FETMS) is proposed for detecting and defending against the On-Off attack for ICN. The simulation results show that FETMS can detect and remove the malicious node that launches the On-Off attack in a detection period. In terms of low latency and high speed, the performance of FETMS is better than TRTMS. In the future, we plan to focus on enhancing the accuracy of detecting other internal attacks based on FETMS. He is the Editor-in-Chief of two international journals and has been the General Chair and the TPC Chair of many international conferences, including the IEEE ICC, the IEEE GLOBECOM, the IEEE HEALTHCOM, and the IEEE LatinCom. VOLUME 7, 2019 
